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 2 
REPEAT BANKRUPTCIES AND THE INTEGRITY OF THE CANADIAN 
BANKRUPTCY PROCESS 
 
Thomas G.W. Telfer*
 
 
 
“In my view, a third bankruptcy is one too many.” 
Re Hardy (1979), 30 C.B.R. (N.S.) 95 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 3.  
 
“And so a third discharge merely prepares the way for a fourth bankruptcy.” 
Re Resnick (1990), 80 C.B.R. (N.S.) 223 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 4. 
 
In 1965, Mr. Rogers filed for bankruptcy. It was not to be his last. Over 25 years, 
Rogers worked for a car dealership in Quebec. His career was rather unremarkable except 
that Rogers failed to remit proper amounts of income tax. Rogers was not bothered by the 
frequent tax arrears. He found a convenient way to deal with his taxes. Drawing on the 
1965 bankruptcy experience, he made assignments in bankruptcy in 1975, 1979, 1984 
and again in 1987.1
The court found that Rogers considered the Bankruptcy Act
  
2 to be “a convenient 
means” to “clear away the income tax arrears.”3
[N]othing useful would be gained by granting him a discharge, with or without conditions. 
He has shown repeatedly that he is unable to organize his affairs in such a way as to fulfill 
his fiscal responsibilities to his fellow citizens. He makes a mockery of the law and 
  
                                                        
* Western University, Faculty of Law. This Working Paper was produced in conjunction with the CIF 
Annual Lloyd Houlden Memorial Research Fellowship Award and is reproduced here with the permission 
of the author and may not be reproduced in whole or in part without the written consent of the Canadian 
Insolvency Foundation and the author. These materials should not be construed as legal advice or legal 
opinions. I would like to thank Western Law student Robyn McLaren JD, 2015 for her research assistance 
on this project. I would also like to thank Sarah Gaudet and Stephanie Cavanagh of the Office of the 
Superintendent of Bankruptcy (OSB) for providing me with bankruptcy statistics. Leona Luk of the OSB 
answered questions on the OSB’s position with respect to repeat bankruptcies. This paper was presented at 
the 43rd Annual Workshop on Commercial and Consumer Law at McGill University in October 2013. I am 
indebted to Stephanie Ben-Ishai and Anthony Duggan who provided comments on an earlier version of the 
paper.  
 
1 Rogers (Trustee of) v. Canada (AG) (1989), 77 C.B.R. (N.S.) 315 (Que. Sup. Ct.), at para. 5.  
 
2 R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3. 
 
3 Rogers, supra, footnote 1, at para. 8. 
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probably cannot be rehabilitated. At the hearing … he was asked what he proposed to do so 
as to avoid a sixth bankruptcy, if he were to be discharged from his fifth. No satisfactory 
answer was forthcoming.4
 
 
The court refused to grant Rogers a discharge since he had “severely tested” “the 
integrity of the bankruptcy process.” 5
While fifth time bankruptcies may be infrequent,
 The case demonstrates the tension between 
rehabilitation, the fundamental goal of the bankruptcy discharge, and the integrity of the 
bankruptcy process. 
6
Rehabilitation has been a traditional and important theme in bankruptcy discharge 
proceedings. First time bankrupts are able to obtain an automatic discharge as early as 9 
months after the date of bankruptcy.
 repeat bankruptcies are not. 
However, there have been no comprehensive studies of second, third, fourth and fifth 
time bankruptcies in Canada from a policy perspective or an empirical basis. The paper 
will combine recent empirical data from the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy 
(OSB) with an analysis of case law on repeat bankrupts. 
7  However, Canadian bankruptcy law has 
traditionally taken the position that a prior bankruptcy will preclude an order of an 
absolute discharge. 8
                                                        
4 Ibid at para. 14. 
 Debtors with three or more bankruptcies are not entitled to an 
absolute discharge. In such a situation, the court must refuse, suspend or grant a 
 
5 Ibid at para. 8. 
 
6 A review of reported case law on the subject only revealed one fifth time bankruptcy. See discussion 
below in Part V.  
 
7 Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 168.1(1)(a)(i) [hereafter BIA]. 
 
8  BIA, supra, footnote 7, at ss. 172, 173(1)(j). See Edouard Martel, “The Debtor’s Discharge from 
Bankruptcy” (1971), 17:4 McGill L.J. 718, at p. 738. This provision can be traced back to the Bankruptcy 
Act of 1919. See Bankruptcy Act of 1919, S.C. 1919, c. 36, ss. 58-59. 
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conditional order of discharge.9 Under recent reforms, second time bankrupts must wait 
either 24 or 36 months before being entitled to an automatic discharge.10 The different 
treatment of repeat bankrupts suggests that there are other policy objectives at play 
beyond rehabilitation. Where there is a repeat bankruptcy, the preservation of the 
integrity of the Canadian bankruptcy process may well override the debtor rehabilitation 
rationale.11
Part I of the paper relies upon recent OSB statistics to demonstrate the extent of 
the multiple bankruptcy problem. Part II examines the rehabilitation rationale in light of 
repeat bankruptcies. Part III considers the 2009 amendments to the BIA that deal with 
second time bankrupts. Part IV discusses third time bankrupts while Part V examines 
fourth and fifth time bankruptcies. Part VI asks whether the mandatory counselling 
requirements in the BIA are working to solve the problem of repeat bankruptcies. The 
paper concludes with Part VII which considers a possible solutions to the problem of 
repeat bankruptcies. 
 The integrity of the bankruptcy regime involves the protection of creditors 
and the public through suspensions, conditional discharges or refusals of discharge. 
I. THE EMERGENCE OF THE REPEAT BANKRUPTCY PROBLEM AND 
RECENT STATISTICS 
The 1980s marked a key turning point in the growth in the number of repeat 
bankruptcies in Canada. One source suggests that the repeat bankruptcy rate was limited 
                                                        
9 BIA, ibid. These new provisions will be considered in a separate section. 
 
10 Ibid., at ss. 168.1(1)(b)(i),-(ii). 
 
11 Re Pitre (2009), 60 C.B.R. (5th) 108 (Sask. Q.B.), at para. 26. See also Frank Bennett, Bennett on 
Bankruptcy, 14th ed. (Toronto: CCH, 2012), at p. 536. 
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to about 2-3% in the late 1970s.12 Indeed, there are only seven instances of reported cases 
involving a repeat bankruptcy that predate 1979.13 The Audit and Evaluation Branch 
(AEB) 2013 report, Evaluation of Mandatory Counselling, notes that while repeat 
bankruptcies were “unusual in the 1970s” the rate grew to 10-12% in the 1980s “because 
of easier access to credit” and “the emergence of complex financial products.”14 In 2002, 
the Personal Insolvency Task Force estimated a 10% repeat filing rate.15 While there 
have been numerous empirical studies on repeat bankruptcies under the US Bankruptcy 
Code,16 there have been a few Canadian studies devoted to the specific issue of repeat 
bankruptcy. 17
                                                        
12 George F. Redling, “Implementation Issues Regarding Bill C-22” (Ottawa: Department of Consumer and 
Corporate Affairs, 1992), at para. 12. See also Wally Clare, “Repeat Bankruptcies of Consumer Debtors” 
(1990),10:6-8 Insolvency Bulletin 201. 
 Furthermore, there have been no Canadian studies that have assessed 
second, third, fourth and fifth time bankruptcies as separate categories. 
 
13 Re Beck (1925), 7 C.B.R. 556 (Que. Sup. Ct.); Re Cruickshanks (1936), 18 C.B.R. 57 (N.S.S.C.); Leger v. 
Hayes (1938), 20 C.B.R. 19 (Que. Sup. Ct.); Re Handler (Good Wear Shoe Co) (1946), 27 C.B.R. 108 (Ont. 
S.C.); Re Volkman (1971), 18 C.B.R. (N.S.) 67 (Que. Sup. Ct.); Re Cameron (1972), 18 C.B.R. (N.S.) 99 
(Que. Sup. Ct.); Laramee v. Diamond (1966), 10 C.B.R. (N.S.) 182 (Que. Sup. Ct.). 
 
14 Industry Canada, Evaluation of Mandatory Counselling (Audit and Evaluation Branch, 2013), at p. 1 
[hereafter AEB Report]. Clare also identifies a 10% rate in 1990. See Clare, supra, footnote 12. J.M. Ferron 
further identifies a 10% rate in 1988. J.M. Ferron, “A Bankruptcy Policy” (1990), 78 C.B.R. (N.S.) 28, at 
para. 18.  
 
15  Personal Insolvency Task Force Final Report (2002), at p. 49, online: 
<http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/vwapj/pitf.pdf/$FILE/pitf.pdf> [hereafter PITF Report]. 
 
16 See e.g., Lance Miller & Michelle M. Miller, “Repeat Filers Under the BAPCPA: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis” [2008], Norton Ann Survey of Bankr. L. 509, at p. 509; J.M. Lown & B. Llewellyn, “Repeat 
Bankruptcy Filers” (2004), 19 Papers of the Western Family Economics Association, at p. 37. J. Golmant 
& T. Ulrich, “Bankruptcy Repeat Filings” (2006), 14 A.B.I. L. Rev. 169, at p. 170; Jean Lown, “Serial 
Bankruptcy Filers No Problem” (2007), A.B.I. J. 36, at p. 36; Paul B. Lewis, “The Repeat Bankruptcy 
Filer: Some Economic Considerations” (2000), 10 New Directions in Bankruptcy 18, at p. 18. 
 
17  Clare, supra, footnote 12; Shelley Antel, A Demographic and Financial Profile of Second Time 
Bankrupts (M.Sc. Thesis, University of Manitoba, 1991) [unpublished]; Ian D.C. Ramsay, “Individual 
Bankruptcy: Preliminary Findings of a Socio-Legal Analysis” (1999), 37:1-2 Osgoode Hall L.J. 15; Judith 
K. Strand, Tahira K. Hira & Richard B. Carter, “Repeat Consumer Bankruptcy: A Comparative Analysis 
with One-time Petitioners in the United States and Canada” (Paper delivered at the AFCPE National 
Conference, Nashville, Tennessee, 8-12 November 1994).  
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Statistics from the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy reveal that the 
Personal Insolvency Task Force’s 2002 estimate of a 10% repeat filing rate is now out of 
date. The most recent 2012 statistics indicate that the Canadian repeat filing rate is 
16.11% for consumer bankruptcies. This rate has increased from 2010 to 2012.18
Percentage of Total Bankruptcies Filed by Consumers with One or More Previous 
Bankruptcies:
 
19
 
 
Year % of Total Consumer Bankruptcies 
2010 14.99% 
2011 15.57% 
2012 16.11% 
 
Provincial statistics reveal that there is a variance in repeat filing rates across the 
country.20
                                                        
18 If the repeat filing rate takes into account debtors with a prior bankruptcy or a prior consumer proposal 
the repeat rate is higher. This rate stands at 20.5% for 2011-2012. AEB Report, supra, footnote 14, at p. 10. 
  
 
19 Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, Draft Report BKHQRA-2157 (Revised), 28 March 2013 
[hereafter OSB Statistics #1]. The number of repeat consumer bankruptcies are determined based on 
information provided in the Estate Information Summary (EIS) form filed by the trustee in bankruptcy. 
This information is captured electronically when the estate is e-filed. OSB analysis indicates that since 
September 2009, over 99% of estates are e-filed. Occasionally when estates are filed jointly, 
inconsistencies can occur when the EIS information is captured electronically in the database. This 
represents a very small percentage of the total number of consumer bankruptcies filed.  
 
20 Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, Draft Report BKHQRA-2308, 20 August 2013 [hereafter 
OSB Statistics # 2]. Provincial statistics do not provide a regional breakdown or an urban rural analysis. 
See Janis P. Sarra, “Economic Rehabilitation: Understanding the Growth in Consumer Proposals” (2008), 
online: Insolvency Research Initiative, Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada, at pp. 26-28 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1399610>.  
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Summary of OSB Statistics 2010-201221
2010 
 
Number of Filings % of total filed 
All consumer bankruptcies 92694 100% 
One or more previous 
bankruptcies 
13897 14.99% 
2nd time filing bankruptcy 12773 13.78% 
3rd time filing bankruptcy 1058 1.14% 
4th time filing bankruptcy 59 0.06% 
5th time filing bankruptcy 7 0.01% 
 
2011 Number of Filings % of total filed 
All consumer bankruptcies 77993 100% 
One or more previous 
bankruptcies 
12145 15.57% 
2nd time filing bankruptcy 11045 14.16% 
3rd time filing bankruptcy 1010 1.29% 
4th time filing bankruptcy 84 0.11% 
5th time filing bankruptcy 6 0.01% 
 
 
                                                         
21 OSB Statistics #1, supra, footnote 19. 
0% 5% 
10% 15% 
20% 25% 
Percentage of Total Bankruptcies in Province filed by Debtors 
who have been Bankrupt on One or More Prior Occasion(s)  
2010 2011 2012 
 8 
2012 Number of Filings % of total filed 
All consumer bankruptcies 71495 100% 
One or more previous 
bankruptcies 
11518 16.11% 
2nd time filing bankruptcy 10456 14.63% 
3rd time filing bankruptcy 977 1.37% 
4th time filing bankruptcy 74 0.10% 
5th time filing bankruptcy 9 0.01 
 
II. THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK AND COMPETING POLICY 
OBJECTIVES 
1. The 2009 Amendments 
Prior to the 2009 amendments, the BIA treated all repeat bankrupts in the same 
way. In the event of any repeat bankruptcy, a court could not award an absolute discharge. 
All repeat bankrupts faced the prospect of a court refusing the discharge or ordering a 
suspended or conditional discharge. 22 The 2009 amendments introduced a significant 
change with respect to the treatment of second time bankruptcies. The amendments to the 
BIA have extended the right of an automatic discharge23 to second time bankrupts after 
waiting a period of either 24 or 36 months.24
                                                        
22 BIA, supra, footnote 7, at ss. 173(1)(j), 172(2). Section 173(1)(j) can be traced back to s. 59 of the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1919. See Bankruptcy Act of 1919, S.C., c. 36, s. 59. This was based on the U.K. 
Bankruptcy Act of 1883. See Bankruptcy Act, 1883 (U.K.), c. 52, s. 28(3)(g). See U.K., H.C., 
Parliamentary Debates, vol. 277 col. 816 at 831-32 (19 March 1883) (Mr. Chamberlain). 
 Second time bankrupts without surplus 
income are now entitled to an automatic discharge 24 months after the date of bankruptcy 
(unless there is an opposition). Second time bankrupts with surplus income may obtain an 
automatic discharge 36 months after the date of bankruptcy.  
 
23 First time bankrupts without surplus income are entitled to an automatic discharge 9 months after the 
date of bankruptcy. See BIA, supra, footnote 7, s. 168.1(1)(a)(i). First time bankrupts with surplus income 
must wait 21 months before obtaining an automatic discharge. See BIA, supra, footnote 7, s. 168.1(1)(a)(ii). 
Stephanie Ben-Ishai, “Discharge” in Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Anthony Duggan, Canadian Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency Law: Bill C-55, Statute c.47 and Beyond (Toronto, LexisNexis, 2007), at p. 360. 
 
24 BIA, supra, footnote 7, s. 168.1(1)(b). See Ben-Ishai, ibid at p. 362. 
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 The amendments can be traced back to the recommendations of the 2002 Personal 
Insolvency Task Force (PITF) and the 2003 Report of the Standing Senate Committee on 
Banking, Trade and Commerce.25  The PITF recommended an automatic discharge for 
second time bankrupts with a 24 month waiting period. The waiting period was suggested 
so as to provide “a discernible and transparent consequence to individuals using the 
bankruptcy system for a second time” 26  and to “provide for greater consistency of 
sanction for second-time bankrupts where no opposition to discharge [was] filed.”27 The 
government’s clause-by-clause analysis of Bill C-55 suggests that the new regime was 
designed to “streamline the bankruptcy process” 28 and eliminate court appearances in 
every case. 29  While creditors, the trustee or the OSB may object to the automatic 
discharge, the new second time bankruptcy provisions operate as a default system and set 
up “an administrative system without court supervision” for second time bankrupts.30
2. Competing Policy Objectives 
 
Third, fourth and fifth time bankrupts continue to be governed by court supervision. 
                                                        
25 PITF Report, supra, footnote 15; Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and 
Commerce, Debtors and Creditors Sharing the Burden: A Review of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act 
and the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (Ottawa: 2003), at p. 59. 
 
26 PITF Report, ibid at p. 49. 
 
27 Ibid. 
 
28 Bill C-55: clause by clause analysis, An Act to establish the Wage Earner Protection Program Act, to 
amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and to make 
consequential amendments to other Acts at cl. 100. Online: http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cilp-
pdci.nsf/eng/h_cl00790.html. 
 
29 Ibid. 
 
30 Bennett, supra, footnote 11, at p. 535. 
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One of the often-cited purposes of bankruptcy law is to permit the rehabilitation 
of the debtor “as a citizen, unfettered by past debts.” 31 The bankruptcy regime thus 
allows an honest but unfortunate debtor to “reintegrate into the business life of the 
country as a useful citizen free from the crushing burden of his or her debts.”32 The 
Ontario Court of Appeal in Bank of Montreal v Giannotti33 cited the following passage 
from Houlden and Morawetz’s Bankruptcy Law of Canada: “The Act permits an honest 
debtor, who has been unfortunate in business, to secure a discharge so that he or she can 
make a fresh start and resume his or her place in the business community.”34
The underlying assumption of rehabilitation is that the debtor will be able to make 
a “new start”
 
35  without the need to resort to bankruptcy again. The United States 
Supreme Court in Local Loan Co v Hunt36
One of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to ‘relieve the honest debtor from the 
weight of oppressive indebtedness, and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations 
and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes.’…. This purpose of the act has 
been again and again emphasized by the courts as being of public as well as private interest, 
in that it gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the 
property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear 
field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing 
debt.
 emphasized the nature of the fresh start: 
37
 
  
                                                        
31 Industrial Acceptance Corp v. Lalonde, [1952] 2 S.C.R. 109, at para. 34, Estey J. See also Vachon v. 
Canada (Employment & Immigration Commission), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 417 at para. 39, Beetz J.; Royal Bank 
of Canada v. North American Life Assurance Co, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 325, at para. 17, Gonthier J.  
 
32 Roderick J. Wood, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law, (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2009), at p. 274. See also Re 
Murray (1971), 15 C.B.R. (N.S.) 252 (B.C.S.C.), at paras. 13-15.  
 
33 (2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 544 (C.A.), MacPherson J.A.. 
 
34 Ibid at para. 11. 
 
35 Re Newsome, [1927] 3 D.L.R. 828, at para 11 (Ont. S.C.). 
 
36 292 US 234 (1934), at p. 244. 
 
37 Ibid. 
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The “clear field for future effort” assumes that the debtor will be reintegrated into the 
economic life of society or will resume his or her place in the community without the 
need for another bankruptcy.  
 Rehabilitation often gives way when there is a repeat filing. The specific 
provisions in the BIA that deal with repeat bankruptcies suggest that other considerations 
beyond rehabilitation become relevant. In the case of multiple bankruptcies, “the Court’s 
focus shifts from a rehabilitative one to one of concern for the integrity of the system, 
protection of creditors and as a brake against future assignment.”38 The British Columbia 
Supreme Court in Re Willier39
By the time an individual has entered a third bankruptcy, the purpose and intent of the Act 
shifts from its remedial purpose of assisting well-intentioned but unfortunate debtors to one 
of protecting society, and in particular unsuspecting potential creditors. The best intentions 
and hopes of such bankrupts become subordinated to the need to protect others from the 
bankrupt's demonstrated financial incompetence, negligence, and carelessness.
 recognized the change in policy objectives: 
40
 
 
The competing objectives of rehabilitation and the protection of the integrity of the 
bankruptcy regime are difficult to reconcile. If one is to preserve the public interest or the 
integrity of the bankruptcy regime by refusing the discharge or by imposing a suspension 
or conditional order, it will be at the expense of the debtor’s rehabilitation. Indeed 
“continued access to the bankruptcy process suggests that rehabilitation has not 
worked.”41                                                        
38 Pitre, supra, footnote 11, at para. 26. See also Re Chaban (1996), 143 Sask. R. 136 (Q.B.), at para. 7; 
Marshall v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1986), 62 C.B.R. (N.S.) 118 (B.C.C.A); Nelson (Trustee of) v. Nelson 
(1995), 33 C.B.R. (3d) 292 (Sask. Q.B.); Re Alousis (2000), 20 C.B.R. (4th) 169 (Ont. S.C.J.); Re Atkin 
(1987), 65 C.B.R. (N.S.) 296 (Ont. S.C.). 
 The new automatic discharge for second time bankrupts after 24 or 36 months 
  
39 (2005), 14 C.B.R. (5th) 130 (B.C.S.C). 
 
40 Ibid at para 12. 
 
41 Karen Gross, Failure and Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankruptcy System, (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University, 1997), at p. 110. 
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has however, provided a compromise in balancing the two objectives; rehabilitation and 
the integrity of the system. The automatic administrative discharge fulfills a rehabilitative 
function while the waiting period sends a signal that there is a consequence to using the 
bankruptcy regime for a second time. The shift from rehabilitation to the integrity of the 
bankruptcy regime represents a concern over the control of the moral hazard problem. 
 
3. Moral Hazard and Repeat Bankruptcies 
From an economic perspective, the bankruptcy discharge provides individual 
debtors with a form of consumption insurance.42 This creates a moral hazard problem.43 
The bankruptcy discharge therefore “decreases individuals’ incentives to constrain their 
consumption and to avoid incurring obligations that they may not be able to repay.”44 
With the availability of the discharge, it is argued that debtors will be incentivized to 
“take on more debts and employ the fresh start benefit strategically.”45
                                                        
42 Anthony Duggan, “Consumer Bankruptcy in Canada and Australia: A Comparative Overview” (2006), 
Ann. Rev. Insol. L. 857, at p. 860 citing Michelle White, “Abuse or Protection? Economics of Bankruptcy 
Reform under BAPCAPA” [2007], Ill. L. Rev. 275, at p. 276. See also Giacomo Rojas Elgueta, “The 
Paradoxical Bankruptcy Discharge: Rereading the Common Law-Civil Law Relationship” (2013) 
(Available at SSRN 2298486), at pp. 37-38; Ning Zhu, “Household Consumption and Personal Bankruptcy” 
(2011), 40:1 J. Legal Stud. 1; Richard M. Hynes, “Optimal Bankruptcy in a Non-Optimal World” (2002), 
44 B.C.L. Rev. 1, at p. 1; Michael D. Sousa, “The Principle of Consumer Utility: A Contemporary Theory 
of the Bankruptcy Discharge” (2009), 58 U. Kan. L. Rev. 553, at p. 608; Adam Feibelman, “Consumer 
Bankruptcy as Development Policy” (2009), 39 Seton Hall L. Rev. 63, at p. 92. 
 Indeed the moral 
hazard problem may well be more prevalent in the event of a repeat bankruptcy. It has 
been argued that the moral hazard argument is “premised upon debtors possessing 
 
43 For a definition of moral hazard see Thomas Jackson, “The Fresh Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law” 
(1985), 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1393, at p. 1402. 
 
44 Adam Feibelman, “Defining the Social Insurance Function of Consumer Bankruptcy” (2005), 13 A.B.I. 
L. Rev. 129, at p. 167; Richard M. Hynes, “Why (Consumer) Bankruptcy” (2004), 56 Ala. L. Rev. 121, at p. 
154; Hynes, supra, footnote 42; Sousa, supra, footnote 42.  
 
45 Elgueta, supra, footnote 42; Zhu, supra, footnote 42.  
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information about the bankruptcy process and the ability to discharge debt.”46 While the 
moral hazard problem may well be diminished for a first time bankrupt without any 
detailed knowledge of the bankruptcy process47
Thus, the BIA seeks to avoid the moral hazard problem, establishing that “certain 
standards of commercial morality … must be maintained.”
 a repeat bankrupt may be able to draw 
upon his or her prior bankruptcy experience with the aim of filing a subsequent strategic 
bankruptcy.  
48  The standards of 
commercial morality are set out in s. 173(1) of the BIA. If any of the factors are proven, a 
court may not grant an absolute discharge and must either refuse, suspend or make a 
conditional order of discharge. 49  As Estey J. indicates in Industrial Acceptance v. 
Lalonde50 “the discharge is, however, not a matter of right and the provisions of secs. 
[172] and [173] plainly indicate that in certain cases the debtor should suffer a period of 
probation.”51
Thus, an absolute discharge may not be granted where the bankruptcy is brought 
on by “rash and hazardous speculations, by unjustifiable extravagance in living, by 
gambling, or by culpable neglect.”
 
52
                                                        
46 Sousa, supra, footnote 42, at p. 609. See also Feibelman, supra, footnote 42, at p. 94. 
 A prior bankruptcy or a proposal is a relevant factor 
47 Sousa, ibid.  
48 Wood, supra, footnote 32, at p. 275. 
 
49 BIA, supra, footnote 7, at s. 172(2). 
 
50 [1952] 2 S.C.R. 109. 
 
51 Ibid at para. 34. 
 
52 Wood, supra, footnote 32, at p. 275; Hynes, supra, footnote 44, at p. 154; Ben-Ishai, supra, footnote 23, 
at p. 359. 
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under s. 173(1)(j) and also breaches the BIA’s standard of commercial morality. 53 It 
follows that a debtor who has filed for bankruptcy three or more times faces the prospect 
of a refusal, suspension or a conditional order. The 2009 amendments have altered the 
standards of commercial morality for second time bankrupts by offering an automatic 
discharge only after 24 or 36 months. The bar against an absolute discharge where there 
are three or more bankruptcies and the new second time bankruptcy provisions are in part 
a response to the moral hazard problem. However, whether or not there is a moral hazard 
problem in any particular case may well turn on the cause of the repeat bankruptcy.54
                                                        
53 See Gurniak v. Royal Bank of Canada (2011), 83 C.B.R. (5th) 87 (S.K.Q.B), at para. 27. (s. 173(1)(j) of 
the BIA is a “fault-based fact.”) 
 
  
54 OSB Statistics #2, supra, footnote 20. Reasons for financial difficulties are provided in text format as the 
response to Question 14 “Give reasons for your financial difficulties” on Form 79 Statement of Affairs. The 
OSB has chosen 17 standard reasons for financial difficulties, as shown in Table 1. Data for student loans, 
loans to friends, cosigning loans for others or failure due to a garnishee action is not shown in Table 1. 
Using a data cleansing and parsing program, the responses provided to Question 14 are assigned reasons for 
financial difficulties by the OSB. Estates may have more than one reason for financial difficulties. For an 
earlier study on the causes of repeat bankruptcies see Strand, Hira & Carter, supra, footnote 17, at p. 28. 
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Table 1: Reasons Reported for Financial Difficulty: 
Value as a percentage of total number of reasons reported by bankrupts annually 
 2010 2011 2012 
 First time Repeat First time Repeat First time Repeat 
Overuse of credit, 
mismanagement, too 
much debt 
30.33% 28.72% 29.93% 28.43% 29.35% 27.66% 
Insufficient income 18.73% 18.94% 18.49% 18.54% 17.93% 18.96% 
Unemployment 15.33% 13.39% 14.28% 12.85% 13.74% 12.13% 
Health concerns, 
medical expenses, 
injuries, family deaths 
9.86% 13.48% 10.37% 13.65% 10.71% 14.20% 
Marital 
Breakdown/Divorce 8.51% 6.99% 9.08% 7.32% 9.69% 7.06% 
Business failure, use 
of personal credit for 
business 
5.76% 5.39% 5.88% 5.68% 6.23% 5.74% 
Supporting parents, 
brothers-sisters, 
relatives 
2.57% 1.90% 2.55% 1.72% 2.43% 1.57% 
Tax liabilities 2.04% 3.54% 2.37% 4.26% 2.76% 5.08% 
Accidents/emergencies 
related to property, i.e. 
fire, theft 
1.13% 1.18% 1.22% 1.31% 1.27% 1.24% 
Bad/poor investments 1.05% 1.05% 1.08% 0.88% 1.07% 0.77% 
Moving, relocation of 
expenses, job change 0.82% 0.63% 0.81% 0.67% 0.80% 0.72% 
Legal action 0.74% 0.90% 0.82% 0.98% 0.87% 0.89% 
Alcoholism, drug 
addiction, substance 
abuse 
0.71% 0.83% 0.76% 0.82% 0.74% 0.86% 
Gambling 0.75% 1.10% 0.68% 0.94% 0.71% 0.97% 
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One argument is that there are two types of repeat bankrupts: “behavioural and 
structural repeat filers.”55 A behavioural debtor will “over-value current consumption and 
underestimate future costs.” 56 In other words, the first type of repeat filer simply “cannot 
stop spending beyond their means.”57
In contrast, a structural repeat filing results from “external factors such as job loss, 
medical problems, and divorce.”
 As noted in Table 1, overuse of credit is the leading 
reason given as the cause of bankruptcy for both first time and repeat bankrupts. This 
suggests that there is a significant moral hazard problem when the cause of failure is 
misuse of credit.  
58 This second type of repeat filer uses bankruptcy to 
“smooth consumption during economic distress”59 which has been caused by one of the 
external factors. Unemployment, 60 health concerns61 and marital breakdowns62
                                                        
55 Miller & Miller, supra, footnote 16, at p. 516. See also Stephen J. Spurr & Kevin M. Ball, “The Effects 
of a Statute (BAPCPA) Designed to Make it More Difficult for People to File for Bankruptcy” (2013), 87 
Amer. Bankr. L.J. 27, at p. 29.  
 have all 
 
56 Miller & Miller, ibid. See also Saul Schwartz, “Personal Bankruptcy Law: A Behavioural Analysis” in J. 
Niemi-kiesilainen, I. Ramsay & W. Whitford eds. Consumer Bankruptcy in a Global Perspective (Oxford; 
Hart Publishing, 2003), at p. 66.  
 
57 Miller & Miller, ibid. 
 
58 Ibid at 517. 
 
59 Ibid. For an earlier study of the causes of repeat bankruptcies see Ramsay, supra, footnote 17.  
 
60 See e.g. Re Hiebert, [2008] 315 Sask. R. 118 (Q.B.), at paras. 4-6; Re Sussman (1990), 77 C.B.R. (N.S.) 
310 (Ont. S.C.), at paras. 1-4; Re Langill (2006), 21 C.B.R (5th) 33 (B.C.S.C.), at paras. 6-8; Re Pace 
(2006), 246 N.S.R. (2d) 236 (S.C.), at para. 2; Re Alonce (2003), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 20 (Alta. Q.B.), at para. 3. 
 
61 See e.g. Re Miller (2007), 257 N.S.R. (2d) 318 (S.C.), at para. 4; Re Judd (1989), 76 C.B.R. (N.S.) 177 
(B.C.S.C.), at para. 2; Re Meek (2009), 50 C.B.R. (5th) 135 (B.C.S.C.), at para. 1; Re Mulligan (2007), 38 
C.B.R. (5th) 89 (B.C. S.C.), at para. 6; Re Nelson (2010), 69 C.B.R. (5th) 292 (B.C.S.C), at para. 6. 
 
62 See e.g. Re Bernier, 2012 QCCS 6166 at para. 14; Re Williams (2005), 10 C.B.R. (5th) 304 (B.C.S.C.), at 
para. 2; Re Overly (2002), 169 Man. R. (2d) 229 (Q.B.), at para. 5; Re Randall (1984), 54 C.B.R. (N.S.) 
121 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 3; Re Kusch (2007), 33 C.B.R. (5th) 208 (B.C.S.C.), at para. 6. 
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been identified as causes of bankruptcy in Table 1. Financial failure in these situations 
may be unexpected, sudden or unanticipated. In these circumstances, the moral hazard 
problem may not be as significant as the bankruptcy may not be strategic. However, since 
more than one reason for failure may be recognized in any particular filing it may be 
difficult to measure the exact nature of the moral hazard problem. A debtor may identify, 
for example, health concerns or medical expenses together with the overuse of credit. 
Substance abuse63 and gambling64 have also been identified as causes of bankruptcy. This 
kind of so-called “compulsive behaviour”65 accounts for less than two percent of the 
reported causes of bankruptcy for repeat bankrupts.66
III. SECOND TIME BANKRUPTS  
  
1. The New Second Time Bankruptcy Regime 
The 2009 amendments are having a profound the impact on the bankruptcy 
regime. For 2010 filings, 84% of all second time bankrupts received an automatic 
discharge after 24 months.67
                                                        
63 See e.g. Re Loiselle, 2013 QCCS 1391 at para. 14; Re Perreault (2011), 200 A.C.W.S. (3d) 317 (Que. 
Sup. Ct.), at para. 29; Re Brown (2008), 49 C.B.R. (5th) 35 (B.C.S.C.), at para. 3; Re Bice (2007), 38 C.B.R. 
(5th) 83 (Alta. Q.B.), at para. 1. 
 The 36 month surplus income provision, however, is having 
less of an impact. Although the 36 month provision was designed to substantially 
 
64 See e.g. Pitre, supra, footnote 11, at para. 6; Re Lok (2010), 71 C.B.R. (5th) 98 (Sask. Q.B.), at para. 5; 
Re Hosseini (2008), 48 C.B.R. (5th) 222 (Ont. Sup. Ct.), at para. 2; Re Bury (2007), 34 C.B.R. (5th) 263 
(Alta. Q.B.). at para. 1; Re Tang (2007), 29 C.B.R. (5th) 258 (Ont. Sup. Ct.), at para, 3. 
 
65 See Carole Anne Curnock “Insolvency Counselling – Innovation based on the Fourteenth Century” 
(1999), 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 387, at p. 392. 
 
66 Curnock, supra, footnote 65, at p. 404. Curnock concludes that “bankruptcy resulting from psychosocial 
problems only applies to an extremely small minority of debtors.” Curnock’s conclusion is more consistent 
with OSB Statistics #2, supra, footnote 20, than an earlier OSB study which suggested that 30 percent of 
repeat bankrupts were related to substance abuse with a possible even greater percentage bankrupts having 
gambling debts. The author was unable to locate a copy of the earlier study but it is referenced in Ferron, 
supra, footnote 14, at para. 21.  
 
67 OSB Statistics #1, supra, footnote 19. 
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increase the “total funds payable to the trustee for distribution to creditors”68
Automatic Discharges after 24 or 36 months
 for 2010 
filings, only 168 bankrupts with surplus income received an automatic discharge after 36 
months. This represents 2% of all second time bankruptcies in 2010. 
69
2010 Filings 
 
Auto. Discharge 24 months Auto. Discharge 36 months 
Total Number Discharged 7225 168 
% of all second time 
bankruptcies 
84% 2% 
 
The BIA is silent on the issue of how much time must elapse before a debtor may 
file for bankruptcy again. In the United States, where a debtor has received a discharge in 
the first bankruptcy, the debtor “is absolutely precluded from receiving a discharge in a 
second case under chapter 7 within eight years.”70 There is no equivalent time bar in the 
BIA, however, it is OSB policy that “if a person has filed a second bankruptcy within a 
three year period subsequent to a previous discharge”71
Prior to 2009, there was little consistency in the length of judicial suspensions for 
a second time bankrupt in the reported case law. At one end of the spectrum, some 
Alberta courts imposed lengthy suspensions ranging from 10
 the file will automatically be 
flagged by the OSB for review to determine whether the OSB should intervene in the 
bankruptcy discharge hearing. 
72 to 25 years. 73                                                        
68 Re Kuss (2009),55 C.B.R. (5th) 289 (Atla. Q.B.), at para. 10.  
 At the other 
 
69 OSB Statistics #1, supra, footnote 19. 
 
70 Charles Jordan Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy, 2d ed. (New York, NY: Thomson Reuters/Foundation 
Press, 2009), at p. 970. “The eight-year period is computed from the date of commencement of case 1 to the 
commencement of case 2, not from discharge to discharge.” See also Hon William L. Norton Jr. & William 
L. Norton III, Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice, 3d ed. (Thomson Reuters, 2013), § 86:18 (Westlaw). 
 
71 Email from Leona Luk, Senior Bankruptcy Analyst, OSB to Thomas Telfer, 24 September 2013. The 
OSB will also determine whether a referral should be made to the Special Investigations Unit (SIU). The 
SIU may in turn pass the file to the RCMP. 
 
72 Re Zapisocki (2002), 316 A.R. 207 (Q.B. Reg.). 
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end of the scale in Re Doe,74 an Ontario court imposed a 1 month suspension where the 
first bankruptcy had preceded the second by 13 years. 75 In fact, outside of Alberta, 
suspensions ranged from 1 month76 to 3 years.77
Parliament chose to replace the judicial discretionary regime with a default rule-
based automatic discharge system.
  
78  On the one hand, the second time discharge system 
avoids costly discharge hearings and imposes a national standard that will be applied 
wherever the bankrupt is residing. 79
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 On the other hand, bright-line rules may not always 
do justice on the merits of each case. Unless there is an objection, the new regime is not 
able to discern whether or not the bankruptcy arose from a moral hazard problem. 
73 Re O’Dell (2000), 269 A.R. 199 (Q.B. Reg.); Re Cardinal (2000), 267 A.R. 199 (Q.B. Reg.). The Alberta 
Court of Queen’s Bench in Re Walterhouse reduced a 25 year suspension to a 5 year suspension on the 
basis that such a lengthy suspension was tantamount to a refusal of a discharge. Re Walterhouse (2002), 
318 A.R. 394 (Q.B.). 
 
74 (1992), 15 C.B.R. (3d) 105 (Ont. Ct. of J.). 
 
75 Ibid. See also Sussman, supra, footnote 60 (court imposed a 3 month suspension); Re Perpich, 2006 
CarswellOnt 6821 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), at para. 13 (6 month suspension); Re Steward, 2000 CarswellOnt 5465 
(Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (6 month suspension). 
 
76 Re Kolody (1999), 178 Sask. R. 137 (Q.B. Reg.); Re Rubin (2011), 74 C.B.R. (5th) 231 (B.C.S.C.). 
 
77 See Re Maurer (2001), 31 C.B.R. (4th) 69 (B.C.S.C.) (2 months); Re Côté 2010 QCCS 412 (3 months); 
Re Ducas, 2010 QCSC 413 (3 months); Re Handfield, 2010 QCSC 415 (3 months); Re Grier (1998), 132 
Man. R. (2d) 26 (Man. Q.B.) (4 months); Re Brown (2010), 364 Sask. R. 300 (Q.B.) (conditional order 
combined with a 6 months); Re Giera (2008), 172 A.C.W.S. (3d) 292 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (conditional order 
combined with 6 months); Gurniak, supra, footnote 53 (conditional order combined with 6 months); Re 
Muzlera (2011), 81 C.B.R. (5th) 113 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (6 months); Overly, supra, footnote 62 (6 months); 
Re Kaufman, 2005 CarswellOnt 3405 (Sup. Ct. J.) (9 months with conditional order); Re Cookson, 1996 
CarswellOnt 1416 (Ont. Bankr.) (9 months); Re White, 1997 CarswellNS 570 (N.S.S.C.) (1 year); Re 
Beaule, (1985) 47 Sask. R. 159 (Q.B.) (conditional order combined with a 1 year); Re Grandoni (2007), 31 
C.B.R. (5th) 282 (B.C.S.C.) (1 year); Re Steeves (2009), 61 C.B.R. (5th) 84 (B.C.S.C.) (1 year); Re Robson 
(2009), 59 C.B.R. (5th) 274 (B.C.S.C.) (18 months); Beck, supra, footnote 13 (2 years); Re Baldwin, 1997 
CarswellBC 607 (S.C.) (2 years); Re Freeman (1984), 54 C.B.R. (N.S.) 181 (B.C.S.C.) (3 years); Re 
Wortsman (1984), 53 C.B.R. (N.S.) 45 (Ont. S.C.) (3 years). 
 
78 On the difference between rules and standards see Thomas G.W. Telfer, “Voidable Preference Reform: A 
New Zealand Perspective on Shifting Standards and Goalposts” (2002), 12 Int. Insolv. Rev. 55, at p. 62. 
 
79 PITF Report, supra, footnote 15, at p. 49. 
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Creditors, trustees and the Superintendent of Bankruptcy80
2. Second Time Bankruptcies Pre 2009 Amendments 
 must be diligent in deciding 
whether to oppose an automatic discharge. Will an automatic discharge in the second 
case set the stage for a third bankruptcy? 
As creditors, trustees or the Superintendent of Bankruptcy can object to the 
automatic discharge and force a hearing, second time jurisprudence that pre-dates the 
amendments remains relevant. Stephanie Ben-Ishai, writing in 2007 suggested that the 
“rhetoric found in decisions on discharge would aid in providing further insight into the 
role and form of dispute resolution in consumer bankruptcy.”81
 There are some common themes in second time bankruptcy jurisprudence. Courts 
have been reluctant to allow debtors to periodically use the BIA to obtain a release of 
their debts.
 The case law reveals 
judicial attitudes towards second time bankrupts.  
82 In Re Lebel83 Anderson J. concluded that the Bankruptcy Act was “not to be 
considered a process which can be had resort to on a regular basis with a view to washing 
out one's debts.”84 A further theme is the emphasis upon the maintenance of the integrity 
of the bankruptcy system. In Re Bury85
                                                        
80 BIA, supra, footnote 7, s. 168.2 on oppositions to an automatic discharge. 
 the court concluded that where there is a repeat or 
 
81 Ben-Ishai, supra, footnote 23, at p. 370. 
 
82 Re Walker (1998), 226 A.R. 212 (Q.B.); Re Ross (2001), 22 C.B.R. (4th) 138 (Alta. Q.B.); Re Czaja, 
2000 ABQB 949; Re Unrau (2001), 26 C.B.R. (4th) 106 (Alta. Q.B.), at para. 6; Re Hatton (1979), 32 
C.B.R. (N.S.) 77 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 2. 
 
83 (1979), 31 C.B.R. (N.S.) 320 (Ont. S.C.).  
 
84 Ibid at para 2. 
 
85 Bury supra, footnote 64. 
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dishonest bankrupt, “the purpose of the Act shifts toward the protection of society, the 
upholding of the integrity of the Act and the sanctioning of inappropriate behavior.” 86
 The balance between rehabilitation and the integrity of the system is tested when 
a debtor repeats patterns of financial misbehavior over two bankruptcies. Perhaps the 
most common and overriding theme in the reported case law is the tendency of a debtor 
to fail a second time for the same or similar reasons as the first bankruptcy. 
 
87 In Re 
Tang88
It would be one thing if this second bankruptcy were the result of misfortune. It is not. It is 
solely the result of the Bankrupt engaging in the same reckless and destructive behaviour 
as led to his first bankruptcy. Not only that, but he engaged in business practices which, 
although clearly legal, effectively preyed on the very weakness in others which has led him 
into bankruptcy not once but twice….This is not the hallmark of either an honest or 
unfortunate debtor, and such a debtor is not deserving, I find, of the fresh start afforded by 
the BIA.
 the court refused a discharge: 
89
 
 
In Re Martens90 both bankruptcies were “tax driven”. The bankrupt decided not to 
file tax returns or pay income tax “and periodically absolve[d] herself of her legal 
obligations by going to the bankruptcy trough, not once but twice.”91
                                                        
86 Ibid at para.10. See also Re Fraser (2009), 53 C.B.R. (5th) 80 (B.C.S.C.), at para. 18.  
  “Having struck 
 
87 Kealey v. Minister of National Revenue, 1999 CarswellOnt 2188 at para. 64 (Ct. J.). See also Bury, ibid at 
para. 10; Fraser, ibid at para. 18;, Re Owen (2010), 71 C.B.R. (5th) 297, (N.B.Q.B.), at para. 9; Re Evans 
(1997), 211 A.R. 76 (Q.B.), at para. 14; Re Hockenhull, [2001] O.J. No. 3061 (Sup. Ct. J.); Re Ngoka 
(1998), 174 Sask. R. 3 (Q.B.); Re Jolin (2008), 170 A.C.W.S. (3d) 237 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), at para. 12; Re 
Chronopoulos, 2007 CarswellOnt 6981 (S.C.); Williams, supra, footnote 62, at para. 12; Re Patrick, [2000] 
O.J. No. 3150 (Sup. Ct. J.). 
 
88 Supra, footnote 64. 
 
89 Ibid at para. 7. 
 
90 [1994] A.J. No. 1265 (Q.B.). 
 
91 Ibid at para. 3. 
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upon what she thought was a good scheme the bankrupt simply continued her obdurate 
conduct.” 92
In this extreme case the overriding principle must be a message. The message is that tax 
cheaters are free riders and they should not be absolved from that. The bankrupt refused to 
"rehabilitate" herself after the first bankruptcy. She just carried on in the same pattern. The 
Act is to be just a convenient ink remover, she thinks, removing what is in the Minister's 
ledger sheets against her.
  
93
 
 
The AEB survey of Trustees, Creditors and the OSB confirms this important 
theme found in the jurisprudence. A common problem with repeats “is that they fall back 
into their bad practices once they get out. They convince themselves they won’t make the 
same mistake.”94 Debtors simply do not “learn from the initial bankruptcy”95 and “fail 
again for the same reasons as their first bankruptcy.”96
In many situations the rehabilitative aspects of the first bankruptcy have no impact 
on the bankrupt.  In Re Gleeson
  
97
The extinguishment of the bankrupt's debts as a result of the discharge in his first 
bankruptcy was meant to give the debtor a fresh start. The rehabilitative aspects of that 
process were lost on the bankrupt and there is no reason to think that a discharge at this 
point in the second bankruptcy would have the effect which the bankruptcy is supposed to 
have.
 Registrar Ferron came to this conclusion: 
98                                                        
92 Ibid at paras. 6-8. 
 
  
93 Ibid at para. 31.  
 
94 Trustee #3, Trustee Responses to Question Four, Appendix C, AEB Report, supra, footnote 14. Answers 
disclosed pursuant to Access to Information Act, Letter from Kimberly Eadie, Director, Information & 
Privacy Rights Administration to Thomas Telfer, 26 August 2013 [hereafter Access to Information Act]. 
 
95 Creditor #3, Creditor Responses to Question Four, Appendix C, AEB Report, supra, footnote 14; Access 
to Information Act, ibid.  
 
96 OSB #6, OSB Responses to Question Four, Appendix C, AEB Report, supra, footnote 14; Access to 
Information Act, ibid.  
 
97 (1990), 80 C.B.R. (N.S.) 127 (Ont. S.C.). 
 
98 Ibid at para. 7. See also Re Osesky (2002), 31 C.B.R. (4th) 80 (Man. Q.B.), at para. 17 (refusal of 
discharge); Hatton, supra, footnote 82, at para. 2; Re Snihur (1985), 53 C.B.R. (N.S.) 149 (Ont. S.C.), at 
para. 5; Re Lloyd, 2000 ABQB 497 at para. 5. See also Re O’Keefe, 2001 ABQB 335 at para. 11; Re 
Koehler (2001), 24 C.B.R. (4th) 59 (Alta. Q.B.); Ross, supra, footnote 82, at para. 8.  
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Indeed evidence of altered behavior may be key to a favourable order of discharge in a 
second bankruptcy.  In Re Hatton99 Anderson J concluded that a second or subsequent 
bankrupt bears a heavy onus “to establish some change in his financial pattern which 
warrants the court making the order sought.”100
IV.  THIRD TIME BANKRUPTCIES  
  
While the BIA makes it clear that where there is a prior bankruptcy the court shall 
refuse, suspend or impose a conditional discharge, 101  there are no other specific 
provisions dealing with third, fourth and fifth time bankrupts. However, where there are 
three or more bankruptcies the OSB will automatically flag the file for review to 
determine whether or not to intervene in the discharge hearing.102 Further, it is the OSB’s 
position that where there are three or more bankruptcies, the debtor should remain in 
bankruptcy for a minimum of 36 months. 103
 
 Third time bankrupts represent a small 
percentage of total consumer filings. However, one should not easily dismiss the fact that 
over the past three years there have been 3045 third time bankruptcies.  
 
 
 
 
                                                         
99 Supra, footnote 82. 
 
100 Hatton, supra, footnote 82, at para. 2. See also Snihur, supra, footnote 98, at para. 5; Hosseini, supra, 
footnote 64, at para. 16. 
 
101 BIA, supra, footnote 7, at ss. 173(1)(j), 172(2).  
 
102 Luk, supra, footnote 71. The OSB will also determine whether a referral should be made to the Special 
Investigations Unit (SIU). The SIU may in turn pass the file to the RCMP. 
 
103 Ibid. 
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Summary of OSB Statistics 2010-2012 Third Time Bankruptcies104
 
 
2010 Number of Filings % of total filed 
All consumer bankruptcies 92694 100% 
One or more previous 
bankruptcies 
13897 14.99% 
3rd time filing bankruptcy 1058 1.14% 
 
2011 Number of Filings % of total filed 
All consumer bankruptcies 77993 100% 
One or more previous 
bankruptcies 
12145 15.57% 
3rd time filing bankruptcy 1010 1.29% 
 
2012 Number of Filings % of total filed 
All consumer bankruptcies 71495 100% 
One or more previous 
bankruptcies 
11518 16.11% 
3rd time filing bankruptcy 977 1.37% 
 
In Re Lynn 105  Suche J. concluded that “third time bankruptcies are of grave 
concern, often demonstrating a degree of irresponsibility that justifies simply refusing a 
discharge.”106 Justice Anderson in Re Hardy107 concluded that a “third bankruptcy is one 
too many.”108 Justice Anderson’s comment has been characterized as a “‘three strikes’” 
rule.”109
                                                        
104 OSB Statistics #1, supra, footnote 19. 
  While it has been held that “there is no rule of law that a third time bankruptcy 
 
105 (2012), 278 Man. R. (2d) 101 (Q.B.). 
 
106 Ibid at para. 22; Re Willier (2005), 14 C.B.R. (5th) 130 (B.C.S.C.), at para. 8. See also Re Grasdal 
(2001), 290 A.R. 389 (Q.B.), at para. 8. 
 
107 (1979), 30 C.B.R. (N.S.) 95 (Ont. S.C.). 
 
108 Ibid at para. 3. 
 
109 Willier, supra, footnote 106, at para. 8. 
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must result in refusal of discharge… the court must nevertheless pay very careful 
attention to the future prospects of a third time bankrupt.”110
The grave concern over third time bankruptcies is reflected in the judicial rhetoric 
in the case law. In refusing a discharge in Re Garness,
  
111 the court characterized the 
bankrupt as having “a SARS-like presence in the local economic community.”112 Over 
three bankruptcies, the debtor had incurred debts of over $579,000.  According to the 
court, the bankrupt and the economic community needed “further economic quarantine 
before discharge [could] be possible.”113 In Re Frolick114 the trustee recommended that a 
third time bankrupt be discharged without conditions. In refusing the application for the 
discharge, Registrar Funduk stated: “Why not go the extra step and also recommend that 
the bankrupt be given a medal for his ability to fornicate the bankruptcy laws.”115
The British Columbia Supreme Court in Re Willier
 
116
By the time an individual has entered a third bankruptcy, the purpose and intent of the Act 
shifts from its remedial purpose of assisting well-intentioned but unfortunate debtors to one 
of protecting society, and in particular unsuspecting potential creditors. The best intentions 
and hopes of such bankrupts become subordinated to the need to protect others from the 
bankrupt's demonstrated financial incompetence, negligence, and carelessness. If there can 
be a concept of debtors' recidivism, it is demonstrated in stark relief by a third-time 
bankrupt.
 acknowledged that an 
important shift occurs when there is a third time bankruptcy: 
117                                                        
110 Pace, supra, footnote 60, at para. 14. See also Re Randall, supra, footnote 62, at para. 10.  
  
 
111 (2004), 5 C.B.R. (5th) 51 (B.C.S.C.). 
 
112 Ibid at para. 21. 
 
113 Ibid. 
 
114 (2001), 294 A.R. 198 (Q.B.). 
 
115 Ibid at para. 16. 
 
116 Supra, footnote 106.  
 
117 Willier, supra, footnote 106, at para. 12. 
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The integrity of the bankruptcy system involves the protection of creditors and the public 
through a refusal of a discharge, suspension or a conditional order.118
 Third time bankruptcy jurisprudence also reveals judicial concern for debtors who 
make the same mistakes again. In the context of the third bankruptcy, Re Lynn
  
119
“Rehabilitation”, in a behavioral context… is comprised of two elements: recognition of 
wrongdoing and a willingness to change. It is a means of establishing some trust 
that…there is a “realistic and reliable likelihood that the mistakes will not be repeated.”
 defined 
rehabilitation in this way: 
120
To consider a discharge for a third time bankrupt “the court must be satisfied that the 
bankrupt has gained sufficient insight and made sufficient changes in his or her life that it 
is not reasonably possible that further bankruptcy will occur.”
 
121 An acknowledgement of 
“blame and acceptance of individual responsibility for the consequences” 122  of the 
bankruptcy is essential. Without this acknowledgment the bankrupt may simply repeat 
past practices. The court must be convinced that “something has been learned by the 
bankrupt that will give some sense of assurance that the cycle of bankruptcy has been 
broken.”123 Creditors of a third time bankrupt are “absolutely entitled to a realistic and 
reliable likelihood that the mistakes will not be repeated.”124                                                                                                                                                                     
 
  
118 Pitre, supra, footnote 11, at para. 26; Chaban, supra, footnote 38, at para. 7. See also Re Beauregard, 
2012 QCSC 6401. 
 
119 (2012), 278 Man. R. (2d) 101 (Q.B.). 
 
120 Ibid at para. 34. See also Re Scattergood (2010), 66 C.B.R. (5th) 103 (B.C. Master), at para. 4; Re 
Resnick (1990), 80 C.B.R. (N.S.) 223 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 4. 
 
121 Willier, supra, footnote 106, at para. 13. 
 
122 Re Garness (2004), 5 C.B.R. (5th) 51 (B.C.S.C.), at para. 19. 
 
123 Pace, supra, footnote 60, at para. 14; Miller, supra, footnote 61, at para. 15. 
 
124 Garness, supra, footnote 122, at para. 19.  
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Registrar Ferron refused to grant a discharge to a third time bankrupt in Re 
Flowerday.125
The pattern is obvious. Debts are accumulated over a five-year period and then the debtor 
files in order to receive a fiscal clearance. This is an abuse of the system which is not to be 
tolerated. The bankrupt has obviously learned nothing from his previous experiences and is 
probably incapable of rehabilitation.
 The court identified a pattern of abuse and concluded that rehabilitation 
was not possible in this situation: 
126
 
 
Registrar Baker in Re Brown 127  expressed the hope that multiple bankrupts become 
bankrupt “for differing reasons.”128 However, Brown “[dashed] that hope: he [had] been 
bankrupt three times, all for the same reason: over-extension of credit.”129 In 22 years, 
Brown had not made “concrete and demonstrable changes”130 on a long-term basis. There 
was no sense that the discharge order would involve notions of rehabilitation. Thus, the 
court held that the “world at large [had] to be protected from him.”131
Despite the judicial rhetoric in the reported case law, statistics reveal that refusals 
of a discharge are rare for third time bankruptcies:
   
132
 
 
 
                                                         
125 (1992), 14 C.B.R. (3d) 297 (Ont. Ct. J.). 
 
126 Ibid at paras. 5-6. 
 
127 Brown, supra, footnote 63.  
 
128 Ibid at para. 1.  
 
129 Ibid at para. 2.  
 
130 Ibid at para. 6.  
 
131 Ibid at para. 9. The court suspended the discharge for a period of three years and barred the bankrupt 
from making applications for credit (except for a personal residence) for a period of 15 years. 
 
132 OSB Statistics #1, supra, footnote 19. 
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Suspensions, Conditional Orders and Refusals of Discharge 
3rd Time 
Bankruptcies 
% 
Suspensions 
%  
Conditional 
Orders 
% Refusals 
2010 58.19 40.96 0.85 
2011 51.38 47.25 1.38 
 
V Fourth and Fifth Time Bankruptcies 
The OSB statistics reveal that fourth and fifth time bankruptcies account for less 
than one percent of all consumer bankruptcies. While one might argue that the percentage 
of fifth time bankrupts to total filings is statistically insignificant, it is of greater concern 
that in 2012, there were 9 fifth time bankruptcies filed. 
 
Summary of OSB Statistics 2010-2012133
2010 
 
Number of Filings % of total filed 
All consumer bankruptcies 92694 100% 
One or more previous 
bankruptcies 
13897 14.99% 
4th time filing bankruptcy 59 0.06% 
5th time filing bankruptcy 7 0.01% 
 
2011 Number of Filings % of total filed 
All consumer bankruptcies 77993 100% 
One or more previous 
bankruptcies 
12145 15.57% 
4th time filing bankruptcy 84 0.11% 
5th time filing bankruptcy 6 0.01% 
 
2012 Number of Filings % of total filed 
All consumer bankruptcies 71495 100% 
One or more previous 
bankruptcies 
11518 16.11% 
4th time filing bankruptcy 74 0.10% 
5th time filing bankruptcy 9 0.01 
 
In a fourth bankruptcy, courts generally apply the same test that is used in a third 
bankruptcy:                                                         
133 Ibid. 
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the test to be applied on a third or fourth bankruptcy shifts from rehabilitating a well-
intentioned but unfortunate debtor to one of protecting society generally and unsuspecting 
creditors in particular.134
 
 
By the time a fourth bankruptcy is reached:  
the primary purpose of any order is to ensure that future creditors are protected while the 
bankrupt attempts such rehabilitation. The order must also serve as a deterrent to others in 
like circumstances.135
 
 
In many of the reported cases the courts refused to grant a discharge. However, the 
actual refusal rate is much lower than that represented in the reported case law. Statistics 
from the OSB demonstrate that in 2011 refusals of discharges are also rare for fourth and 
fifth time bankruptcies.136
Suspensions, Conditional Orders and Refusals of Discharge 
 
 % 
Suspensions 
%  
Conditional 
Orders 
% Refusals 
2010 47.37 26.32 26.32 
2011 40.54 54.05 5.41 
 
 Like other repeat bankruptcy cases, four time bankrupts follow patterns of past 
behavior. In Re Mulligan137 the court concluded that the bankrupt had not learned from 
“her past bankruptcies” and “society [needed] to be protected from Mrs. Mulligan’s 
incompetent use of credit.” 138  The court was of the view that the bankrupt “[had] 
repeatedly shown that she [could not] budget within her means.”139
                                                        
134 Hiebert, supra, footnote 60, at para. 19. See also Kusch, supra, footnote 62, at para. 12.  
 The court suspended 
the discharge for a period of 15 years. 
 
135 Re Herd (2009), 60 C.B.R. (5th) 158 (B.C.S.C.), at para. 20.  
 
136 OSB Statistics #1, supra, footnote 19. 
 
137 Supra, footnote 61. 
 
138 Ibid at para. 15. 
 
139 Ibid at para. 16. See also Re Tomkins (1990), 80 C.B.R. (N.S.) 35 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 1. 
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 In Re Kusch140 the bankrupt claimed that he was not at fault for his first three 
bankruptcies. While the court acknowledged that the bankrupt “had some misfortune”141 
there was “no indication that he [accepted] any personal responsibility for it.”142
The number of bankruptcies and his apparent inability to see how his actions may have 
contributed to the circumstance leading to the bankruptcy gives me reason to believe that if 
I discharge him, I will be setting the stage for bankruptcy number 5.
 The 
court refused his discharge:  
143
 
  
The court concluded that the bankrupt had not “learned anything from [the] past 
bankruptcies, other than he was a hapless victim of circumstance.” 144
then he will have to demonstrate at that time that he has learned something about financial 
management and that he can demonstrate financial prudence. The court would, at that time, 
be looking for a clear plan as to how he would plan to avoid future financial problems and 
some indication that he is implementing that plan.
 Master Young 
stipulated that the bankrupt could not reapply for a discharge for a period of two years. If 
the bankrupt wanted to apply at that time:   
145
 
  
VI. MANDATORY COUNSELLING  
In 1992, Parliament amended the BIA to require mandatory counselling for all 
bankrupts.146
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 Parliament added the mandatory counselling provisions in order to reduce 
140 Kusch, supra, footnote 62. 
 
141 Ibid at para. 8. 
 
142 Ibid. 
 
143 Ibid at para. 9. 
 
144 Ibid at para. 13. 
 
145 Ibid at para. 14. See also Hiebert, supra, footnote 60; Herd, supra, footnote 135; Re Dennison (2013), 
230 A.C.W.S (3d) 966 (Sask. Q.B.). 
 
146 BIA, supra, footnote 7, s.157.1. See OSB Directive IR3. On the origins of mandatory counselling see 
Iain Ramsay, “Mandatory Bankruptcy Counselling: The Canadian Experience” (2002), 7:2 Fordham J. 
Corp. & Fin. L. 525; Curnock, supra, footnote 65; Saul Schwartz, “The Effect of Bankruptcy Counseling 
on Future Creditworthiness: Evidence from a Natural Experiment” (2003), 77 Am. Bankr. L.J. 257, at p. 
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the number of repeat bankrupts.147 The 2013 AEB Report on Mandatory Counselling 
concludes that Parliament introduced mandatory counselling “to help avoid repeat 
personal bankruptcies by providing debtors with information and education on financial 
management.”148
Writing in 1999, Berry and McGregor optimistically claimed that the introduction 
of mandatory counselling “could lead to fewer repeat bankruptcies, better educated 
consumers, and rehabilitation of those debtors teetering on the edge, or in the cycle, of 
bankruptcy.”
 
149 In Re Newsham150
In bankruptcy the debtor is required to attend two counselling sessions. A recognition of 
the cause of bankruptcy and the prevention of a repeat bankruptcy is a necessary ingredient 
of counselling. Budget preparation and the proper use of credit cards must be an important 
component of most counselling sessions. Because of the rise in second, third and fourth 
time bankruptcies, counselling to avoid repeat assignments is viewed by the courts as an 
important and necessary ingredient in the process.
 the court identified the underlying goal of mandatory 
counselling: 
151
 
 
Given the increasing rate of repeat bankruptcies one has to ask whether mandatory 
counselling has been effective in preventing repeat bankruptcies. The AEB Report on 
Mandatory Counselling concluded that “mandatory counselling addresses a continued 
need by contributing to the rehabilitation of debtors and helping them avoid future                                                                                                                                                                      
259. 
 
147 Iain Ramsay, “Interest Groups and the Politics of Consumer Bankruptcy Reform in Canada” (2003), 
53:4 U.T.L.J. 379, at pp. 406-407; Ruth E. Berry & Sue L.T. McGregor, “Evolution of Statutory Consumer 
Counseling in Canada and Europe: Counseling Consumer Debtors Under Canada’s Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency Act” (1999), 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 369, at p. 371; Schwartz, ibid, at p. 267. 
 
148 AEB Report, supra, footnote 14, at p. 1. See also Julio Caruso & Éric Archambault, Measuring the 
Effectiveness of Credit Counselling: An Enviornmental Scan, (Montreal: Science-Metrix Inc, 1992) at p.1 
(Appendix B to AEB Report). 
 
149 Berry & McGregor, supra, footnote 147, at pp. 384-385.  
 
150 (2003), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 121 (Alta. Q.B.). 
 
151 Ibid at para. 10. 
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financial difficulties.”152 According to the Report, “mandatory counselling had a positive 
impact on debtors.”153 The Report specifically assessed mandatory counselling in light of 
evidence of repeat bankruptcies. The AEB Report concluded that “debtors who cited the 
overuse of credit as a reason for their financial difficulties were less likely to be 
repeats.”154 The Report also concluded that debtors who reported overuse of credit as the 
reason for failure “were less likely to be repeat filers.”155 The AEB Report found that 
where a debtor reported overuse of credit “then the probability that the debtor had a 
previous bankruptcy or insolvency dropped by 3.7%.”156
However, the effectiveness of mandatory counselling to combat repeat filings must 
be considered in light of the causes of bankruptcies for repeat bankrupts. If bankrupts 
were truly gaining financial skills through the mandatory counselling program, one would 
expect that misuse of credit would play a much lesser role in the cause of a repeat filing. 
OSB data on the causes of bankruptcies demonstrates that for repeats and first time 
bankrupts, overuse of credit is the leading cause of bankruptcy and there is similarity in 
the response rate.
 
157
                                                        
152 AEB Report, supra, footnote 14, at p. 27.  
 In 2012, repeat bankrupts identified overuse of credit as the cause of 
bankruptcy 27.6 percent of the time while first time bankrupts reported overuse of credit 
as a reason for financial failure 29.35 percent of the time.  
 
153 Ibid. 
 
154 Ibid at p. 18. 
. 
155 Ibid at p. 27. 
 
156 Ibid at p. 18. 
 
157 See Table 1. 
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Beyond misuse of credit a there may be structural158 reasons for failure. Debtors 
may fail for reasons beyond their control. As noted in Table 1, bankrupts have identified 
for example, medical concerns as a cause of bankruptcy. One has to ask whether credit 
counselling has any impact in this situation. As Saul Schwartz notes “there is no reason to 
believe that credit counseling is effective for debtors who file for bankruptcy because 
illness prevents them from working.”159
Further, a review of the jurisprudence confirms that rehabilitation played little role 
in preventing subsequent bankruptcies as debtors simply made the same financial 
mistakes over and over again. One has to ask whether mandatory counselling will ever 
have the potential to prevent repeat bankruptcies. Saul Schwartz’s study indicates that 
counselling does not lead to “any appreciable improvement in future 
creditworthiness.”
  
160  His study concludes that “counseling has little effect on repeat 
bankruptcy in the first five years after an initial bankruptcy filing.” 161 Indeed repeat 
bankruptcies may be “an indication that our bankruptcy system is not responding 
effectively to the inadequate knowledge and financial skills of first-time bankrupts.”162
                                                        
158 Miller & Miller, supra, footnote 16, at p. 516.  
  
 
159 Schwartz, supra, footnote 146, at pp. 267-268. Table 1 indicates that repeat bankrupts report health 
concerns as a cause of bankruptcy more often than first time bankrupts. 
 
160 Schwartz, supra, footnote 146, at p. 277. 
 
161 Ibid at 274. 
 
162 Clare, supra, footnote 12. 
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It is not clear that bankrupts are gaining the necessary skills to avoid a repeat 
bankruptcy. In refusing a discharge in a fourth time bankruptcy case, the court in Re 
Hiebert163
I am not satisfied that Hiebert has gained sufficient insight into proper financial 
management, budgeting and use of credit, nor am I persuaded that he has made appropriate 
changes in his life to prevent another bankruptcy from occurring. Regrettably, I conclude 
that the protection of society and unsuspecting creditors can only be achieved by refusing 
his discharge application.
 concluded: 
164
 
 
In another fourth time bankruptcy case, Mr. Boivin indicated that “during the 
current bankruptcy he had attended credit counselling of a type he had not received 
before.”165 Boivin alleged that from the counselling “he [felt] he [had] made tremendous 
progress he in understanding how to live within his means.” 166  Notwithstanding the 
bankrupt’s reference to credit counselling, the court was “not satisfied that the bankrupt 
[had] gained sufficient insight and made sufficient changes in his life that it [was] not 
reasonably possible that a further bankruptcy [would] occur.”167
Over a period of 30 years this bankrupt has left unpaid creditors with total debts of about 
$834,000 due to his profligate and utterly irresponsible use of credit or failure to pay 
taxes....[H]e has...had a financially pestilential effect on those unpaid creditors he has left 
in his wake.
 
168
 
 
Finally, if mandatory counselling was serving its intended purpose, one would expect that 
the overall repeat filing rate would be decreasing and not increasing.  
                                                         
163 Supra, footnote 60. 
 
164 Ibid at para 20. 
 
165 Re Boivin (2008), 40 C.B.R. (5th) 281, at para. 12. 
 
166 Ibid. 
 
167 Ibid at para 19. 
 
168 Ibid at para 18. 
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VII.  POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS? 
 Over time a number of solutions have been proposed to deal with the ongoing 
problem of repeat bankruptcies. For example, provisions relating to repeat bankruptcies 
may be traced back to a 1732 English statute.169 Under this provision, a bankrupt was 
entitled to a discharge for a second time only if a 75% dividend was paid in the second 
case.170 Given this high dividend threshold it seems likely that under such a regime few 
bankrupts received a discharge in the second case. The current US solution, which 
prevents a debtor from receiving a discharge in a second chapter 7 case within eight 
years, 171
 Any Canadian reforms might target second time bankrupts. Second time 
bankruptcies represent the highest proportion of all repeat bankruptcies. Further, initial 
data on the 2009 amendments suggests that a significant percentage of those second time 
bankrupts are receiving an automatic discharge after 24 months. If there is concern 
second time bankrupts are flowing through the automatic discharge regime unopposed, 
one might look to current OSB policy on second time bankrupts for a possible reform 
solution. It is current OSB policy that “if a person has filed a second bankruptcy within a 
three year period subsequent to a previous discharge”
 is over inclusive.  The eight year time bar does not distinguish between 
behavioural debtors and structural debtors (ie debtors who failed for reasons beyond their 
control.) All debtors are equally barred. 
172
                                                        
169 5 Geo 2, c 30, s 9. See Charles Jordan Tabb, “The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge” 
(1991), 65 Am. Bankr. L.J. 325, at pp. 341-342. 
 the file will automatically be 
 
170 Tabb, ibid. 
 
171 Tabb, supra, footnote 70, at p. 970.  
 
172 Luk, supra, footnote 71. 
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flagged by the OSB for review to determine whether the OSB should intervene in the 
bankruptcy discharge hearing. If the high rate of second time automatic discharges 
continues unabated one might translate OSB policy into legislation. Where a person has 
filed a second bankruptcy within a three year period subsequent to a previous discharge 
the BIA could be amended to provide that the person is not entitled to an automatic 
discharge and the matter should be referred to the court for a discharge hearing. In that 
situation the court shall either refuse the discharge, suspend the discharge or impose a 
conditional order.173
While such an approach would be able to remedy an abusive second filing, the 
court would also have the discretion to fashion an appropriate solution where the debtor 
had failed for reasons beyond his or her control. Unlike the US provision, the proposal 
does not set up an automatic three year time bar. The reform proposal would merely 
trigger a discharge hearing when that second bankruptcy falls within three years of the 
prior discharge.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Repeat bankruptcies come with certain costs. In particular they can contribute to 
slower economic growth by “increasing the costs for goods, services and credit.” 174 
Indeed, creditors interviewed in the AEB study indicated a lower repeat filing rate could 
lead to lower consumer credit costs.175
                                                        
173 BIA, supra, footnote 7, at s. 172(2). Where there is no surplus income the suspension should be for a 
minimum of 24 months. If there is surplus income the suspension should be for a minimum of 36 months. 
 Additionally, repeat bankruptcies “can lead to 
increased ... administration costs due to the processing of filings and the monitoring of 
 
174 AEB Report, supra, footnote 14, at p. 11. See Lewis, supra, footnote 16, at p. 22.  
 
175 AEB Report, ibid. 
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the debtor.”176 Repeat bankruptcies also come with economic costs for the debtor.177 A 
repeat bankrupt may remain an undischarged bankrupt for a substantial period of time. 
This will have a significant impact on the debtor’s ability to obtain credit. The BIA 
makes it an offence for a bankrupt to obtain credit of $1000 or more from any person 
“without informing them that the undischarged bankrupt is an undischarged bankrupt.”178
 In particular, abusive repeat filings (i.e. where moral hazard problems are present) 
create problems for the bankruptcy system in Canada and elsewhere.
 
179  The task, 
however, is to separate the abusive repeat filings from the repeat filings that arise from 
circumstances that may be beyond the control of the debtor. 180  It is important to 
distinguish between those debtors who require more than one bankruptcy to obtain a 
release of their debts and a debtor who is “abusing the system to escape their credit 
obligations.” 181
 Mandatory counselling may not be the solution to the problem of repeat 
bankruptcies. Although counselling seeks to provide bankrupts with necessary financial 
 Given the high percentage of second time bankrupts receiving an 
automatic discharge, one must ask whether the new second time regime is able to draw 
this distinction.  
                                                        
176 Ibid. 
 
177 Bankruptcy also affects the credit ratings of the debtor as information about the bankruptcy will be kept 
on the credit files of bankrupts for six years after the date of the discharge. See Schwartz, supra, footnote 
146, at p. 257.  
 
178 BIA, supra, footnote 7, at s. 199(b). See e.g. Tomkins, supra, footnote 139, at para. 4; Hiebert, supra, 
footnote 60, at para. 21. On the origins of s. 199 see Bankruptcy Act, 1883 (U.K.), c. 52, s. 31. U.K., H.C., 
Parliamentary Debates, vol. 277 col. 816, at 831-32 (19 March 1883) (Mr. Chamberlain). 
 
179 Lewis, supra, footnote 16, at p. 18.  
 
180 Ibid at 22. 
 
181 Lown & Llewellyn, supra, footnote 16, at p. 37.  
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skills for financial success, repeat bankrupts still identify the misuse of credit as the 
leading cause of failure. Further, the fact that many bankrupts repeat patterns of financial 
mismanagement suggests that mandatory counselling may not be an effective way to 
reduce multiple filings. Indeed, bankrupts must learn something from the counselling 
sessions or they risk the chance of return.182 Repeat filings also raise questions about the 
role that creditors play in making credit available to former bankrupts. To what extent 
should lenders bear some responsibility for the repeat bankruptcy problem?183
 
 
                                                        
182 See results of trusee survey found in Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Saul Schwartz, “Bankruptcy for the Poor?” 
(2007), 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 471, at p. 501. 
 
183 Creditor #2, Creditor Responses to Question Four, Appendix C, AEB Report, supra, footnote 14; Access 
to Information Act, supra, footnote 94; Strand, Hira & Carter, supra, footnote 17, at p.35. On the issue of 
responsible lending see Jacob Ziegel, “Consumer Insolvencies, Consumer Credit and Responsible Lending,” 
online: <http://www.cairp.ca/canadian-insolvency-foundation/houlden-fellowship/>. 
 
 
